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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, CONFLICT OF LAWS
AND THE CONSTITUTION
CLYDE W. WELLEN*
THE choice of law problems encountered in workmen's com-
pensation cases resulting from injuries incurred in the course of an
employment extending over state lines and the extraterritorial
applicability of workmen's compensation statutes was considered
in a previous installment of this article.*" The purpose of this
installment is to discuss the influence of the United States Consti-
tution on the choice of the proper law in workmen's compensation
cases and to demonstrate how the Constitution might be further
utilized by Congress and the Courts to establish some degree of
uniformity in this unsettled field.
B. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND CHOICE OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW.
1: Full Faith and Credit:
Art. IV, Sec. 1 of the United States Constitution provides, "Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved and the Effect
thereof."
In its present form, the statute enacted by Congress under this
power, after dealing with methods of authentication and proof,
reads, "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings, or copies there-
of so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States and its Territories and Pos-
sessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possesesion from which they are taken."6 2
In the early days, cases involving the full faith and credit
clause were confined almost wholly to enforcement of judgments
of a sister state. In more recent years the inquiry has also included
the extent to which the clause applies to state law.6 3 The question
of the extent to which the workmen's compensation act of a state
must be given full faith and credit in a sister state was first con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston, Houston, Texas.
* 55 W. VA. L. R1v. 131 (1953).
6228 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948) . _63 Moore and Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and Credit,
29 VA. L. REv. 557 (1943); Cheatham, Res Adjudicata and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, 44 COL. L. REv. 330 (1944).
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Clapper.864 Clapper, an employee of a Vermont company was
killed while working temporarily in New Hampshire. He was a
domiciliary of Vermont, and had been hired and regularly em-
ployed there, but his administratrix brought an action for wrongful
death under the New Hampshire law, which permitted an election
of remedies after injury.65  The defense of the company was that
Clapper had come within the coverage of the Vermont Compensa-
tion Act, and that that act had provided compensation thereunder
should be the exclusive remedy of an employee coming within its
terms. The lower federal courts found death was due to the em-
ployer's negligence, and that New Hampshire law should govern,
since it was the state where the injury occurred."8 On certiorari
to the Supreme Court, it was held that refusal to allow the com-
pany's defense was a denial of full faith and credit under the
Federal Constitution. Both the exclusive nature of the Vermont
act and New Hampshire's lack of governmental interest in the
case were emphasised by the Court. It was said:
"Obviously the power of Vermont to effect legal conse-
quences by legislation is not limited strictly to occurrences
within its own boundaries. It has power through its own
tribunals to grant compensation to local employees, locally
employed, for injuries received outside its borders, . . . and
likewise has power to exclude from its own court, proceedings
for any other form of relief for such injuries....
"The interest of New Hampshire was only casual. Clapper
was not a resident there. So far as appears, he had no depend-
ents there. It is difficult to see how the state's interest would
be subserved under such circumstances, by burdening its
courts with this legislation."
Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the result, stating that in the
absence of a controlling decision of the New Hampshire court, the
federal district court should have recognized the Vermont statute
on principles of comity. 6 In the face of the principle that a deci-
sion should not be rested upon constitutional grounds, unless such
a course is essential to the result, the majority opinion is all the
more forceful as a constitutional precedent. The Supreme Court's
choice of a single law to control rights and liabilities incident to
the employment relation marked the first step in securing uni-
formity of remedy for industrial accidents through constitutional
64 286 U.S. 145, 32 COL. L. REv. 131, 46 HARv. L. REV. 291, 80 MICH. L. REv.
1118 (1932).
65 N.H. Pub. Laws. c. 178, § 11 (1926).
66 Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 51 F.2d 992 (1st Cir. 1931).
67 See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1982)
(concurring opinion).
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interpretation. It was thought at the time that this decision was
destined to overhaul radically the previous theories concerning
the applicability of workmen's compensation acts. 8 Limitations
of its implications were soon to appear.
The first such limitation appeared in Ohio v. Chattanooga
Boiler & Tank Co., 9 the next case to reach the Supreme Court
involving this problem. The decedent, a resident of Tennessee,
was employed there by a Tennessee corporation. A condition of
the employment was that he should serve also in other states.
While working for the defendant in Ohio, the decedent was fatally
injured. Both the employer and decedent had accepted the Ten-
nessee compensation act, but the company had taken no steps to
come within the coverage of the Ohio statute. The Tennessee
act by its terms applied to injuries elsewhere than in the state if
the contract of employment were made in Tennessee, "unless other-
wise expressly provided by contract", and also made the rights and
remedies under the act exclusive of all other rights and remedies.
The decedent's widow, nevertheless, filed an application for compen-
sation in Ohio, and received an award of nearly five thousand
dollars. The amount of compensation in Tennessee would have
been twenty two hundred dollars. The state of Ohio, thereupon,
sought to recover from the defendant, the decedent's employer,
the amount paid the widow by the Ohio commission. The de-
fendant resisted, claiming that any award should have been made
under the Tennessee compensation act, and that to award com-
pensation under the Ohio act was to deny such full faith and
credit to the laws of Tennessee as was required by the Clapper
case. The Supreme Court held for the state of Ohio, and said that
the Clapper case did not require that a state statute be given full
faith and credit in a sister state, unless such statute either on its
face or by court interpretation, seeks to provide exclusively for the
employee's injuries. It was determined that the Tennessee act,
under these facts, did not provide an exclusive remedy, so full faith
and credit was not required. To justify this conclusion the Court
relied on a decision by the Tennessee supreme court,7 0 that the
widow could not seek compensation under the Tennessee law after
having applied for compensation in Ohio, this being tantamount
to an election not to come within the Tennessee compensation act.
68 Beale, Two Cases on jurisdiction, 48 HARv. L. REv. 620 (1955),
69 289 U.S. 439 (1933).
70 Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 163 Tenn. 420, 43 S.W.2d 221
(1931).
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In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,7 1 the
Supreme Court further restricted the conditions under which a
workmen's compensation statute must be given full faith and credit
in a sister state. The employee was hired in California to per-
form work in Alaska, and the parties expressly adopted the Alaska
act, which by its terms provided its remedies were to be exclusive.
While in Alaska, the workman, who was a nonresident of both
Alaska and California, was injured. Upon returning to California,
he brought an action for compensation before the California
board and under the California act. The court weighed the govern-
mental interests of the two jurisdictions involved, and found that
of California great enough to justify the application of its com-
pensation act, despite the fact that the parties had expressly
stipulated to be bound by the law of Alaska, and that the injury
occurred there. Thus, for the act of a state to be entitled to full
faith and credit in another state, the additional condition was
imposed that the other state involved (which will sometimes be the
state of employment and other times the state of injury) must have
only a casual interest in the employment relationship. What the
Court meant by casual interest was not made clear. Further light was
cast on the question by Pacific Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Board1
2
There an employee of a Massachusetts corporation, who was a
resident of that state, and regularly employed there, was injured
in the course of his employment while temporarily working in
California. The compensation act of each state provided that its
remedies were exclusive. The Supreme Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Stone, said:
"The Clhpper case cannot be said to have decided more
than that a state statute applicable to an employer and em-
ployee within the state, which by its terms provides compen-
sation for an employee if he is injured in the course ofhis
employment, while temporarily in another state, will be given
full faith and credit in the latter state when not obnoxious to
its policy.' '7 3
The Massachusetts statute was found to be obnoxious to the
public policy of California, as expressed by its courts, and em-
bodied in its act, since it denied California physicians and hospitals
the certainty of receiving the pay granted by the California act for
helping injured employees, and possibly would require them to go
to another state to collect their charges. It was held, therefore,
71294 U.S. 532, 23 CALiF. L. REv. 449, 35 COL. L. REV. 751 (1935).
723 06 U.S. 493, 39 COL. L. Rav. 1024, 24 VA. L. R1v. 799 (1939).
73 ld. at 504.
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that California need not give full faith and credit to the Massa-
chusetts act. The facts in the Pacific case were substantially
identical to those in the Clapper case. The difference in the
result reached in the instant case was rationalized by pointing out
that the applicability of the foreign act in the Clapper case was not
obnoxious to the New Hampshire public policy,7 4 while in the
Pacific case the public policy of California demanded that only
its act be applied. Since either one or both of the two factors of
public policy, (a) that the employee might become a public charge
to the forum, or (b) that the economic interests of physicians and
hospitals of the forum must be protected, are likely to be present
in any case that may arise, there will probably be few cases where
the Supreme Court will compel a state to recognize the applicability
of a foreign statute.
Under the existing state of the law, the forum must recognize
a foreign statute as applicable only: (1) when that statute provides
that it is the exclusive remedy in case of extraterritorial injury, and
(2) when the forum has no governmental interest to preserve in
making an award. Applying these tests, it seems clear that either
the state of injury, or the state of employment will have power to
make an award in nearly every situation. In the event that such
an award is made by one of the states having a contact with the
employment relation, what will be the effect of the award on
further proceedings in a second state? Should the workman's
claim be considered indivisible and treated like a common law
cause of action? If this is done when an award is made in one
state, the whole claim will be merged into the award, as is a cause
of action merged into a judgment at common law, thus preventing
a second satisfaction for the same injury. If an award is made
by a court and is final, it is of course conclusive between the parties
with respect to the matters it covers, and entitled to full faith and
credit in a second jurisdiction.- Workmen's compensation claims,
however, are not usually heard by courts of law, but are deter-
mined by special administrative tribunals set up for that purpose,
so it is questionable whether their awards should be given the
same full faith and credit in a second jurisdiction as an ordinary
judgment; and, even if these proceedings are judicial, there is the
further question whether they could logically affect a claim in
74 See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1932)
(concurring opinion), discussed supra. Cf. Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
330 U.S. 469 (1947); B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Britton, 139 F.2d 362 (App. D.C.
194375 Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470 (1930).
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another state, since they only determine rights to compensation
under local law. The courts are not uniform in their answers
to these questions. According to one view, workmen's compensa-
tion awards are treated as a complete adjudication of the rights
of the parties, and entitled to full faith and credit under the
Federal Constitution, regardless of whether the proceedings are
those of a court of general jurisdiction or those of statutory tribu-
nals set up solely to administer the compensation laws.70 The
conclusion, that these awards should be given the same full faith
and credit as proceedings of a court of general jurisdiction, was
fortified by the decision of the Supreme Court in Broderick v.
Rosner77 in which it was held that administrative action involving
a stockholder assessment was entitled to full faith and credit in a
sister state. In many states, while recognizing that these awards
are entitled to full faith and credit, it was said that they only
determine the right to compensation under the law of the state
where rendered, and do not bar the employee's claim in another
state with respect to the same injury. In the states permitting a
second award, it is provided, however, either by statute, 8 or by
decision,7 9 that the amount received in the initial award outside
the state shall be deducted from the local award, so that the em-
ployee's total compensation would be no greater than the measure
he would have received had he pursued only his local claim. The
question of whether a final award in one state constitutionally
bars a subsequent recovery of compensation for the same injury in a
second state, was squarely presented in the United States Supreme
Court in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt.0 Hunt, a resident of
Louisiana, was employed there by the defendant company as a labor-
er in connection with drilling oil wells. In the course of his employ-
ment he went from Louisiana to Texas, and while working there
was injured. The latter state awarded him compensation, but subse-
quently he made a claim for the same injury in Louisiana. The
76 Martinez v. W. G. Fritz Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 399, 165 Atl. 873 (1933);
DeGray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., 106 Vt. 259, 173 At. 556 (1934).
77294 U.S. 629 (1936).
78 FLA. STATS. § 440.09 (1) (1941); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 114, § 411 (Park, et al.
1936); MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, § 80 (3) (Flack, 1939) ; 011 CoDE ANN. § 1465-68
(Throckmorton, Supp. 1943); N.C. GEN. STATS. c. 97, art. 1, § 36 (Michie &
Sublett, 1943); S.C. CODE § 7035-39 (1942); VA. CODE ANN. § 1887 (37) (1942).
79 Salvation Army v. Industrial Comm'n, 219 Wisc. 343, 263 N.W. 349 (1935);
Price v. Horton Motor Lines, 201 S.C. 484, 23 S.E.2d 744 (1942); Miller v.
National Chair Co., 129 N.J.L. 98, 28 A.2d 125 (1942); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 403 (1934).
80 320 U.S. 430, 150 A.L.R. 413 (1943), 44 COL. L. REV. 330, 92 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 401 (1944).
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insurer set up the Texas award as a bar, and invoked the full
faith and credit clause. The Louisiana board made an award
(its act providing a higher rate of compensation) after deducting
the amount of the Texas payment. The Supreme Court vacated
the second award on the ground that a final award for compensa-
tion under the Texas act had the same effect as a judgment, and
was res judicata as to all matters which had been, or could have
been litigated; that, since there was but one injury, there was but
one cause of action which merged in the award; and, since the
matter was res judicata in Texas, it must be given the same effect
elsewhere as in the case of any other judgment for money in a
civil action. There were four dissents to the Magnolia decision.
Separate dissenting opinions were written by Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Justice Douglas. The principal grounds of dissent were:
(1) that Texas did not intend the award of compensation by its
industrial accident board to bar the rights granted to Hunt in
other states, and (2) even if Texas did intend its award to have
this effect, the claim of Hunt was not indivisible, so that the Texas
award was res judicata only concerning Hunt's claim in Texas.
In Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin v. McCartin,81 the next
case to reach the Supreme Court involving the .extraterritorial
effects of workmen's compensation awards, the effects of the Mag-
nolia decision were virtually negated. McCartin hired one Kopp to
work for him as a bricklayer in Wisconsin. Both the employer
and employee were residents of Illinois and the contract of em-
ployment was made in that state. For an injury suffered while
working in Wisconsin, Kopp filed claims against McCartin in both
states. The parties made a settlement which, pursuant to Illinois
procedure, was entered as an award. The Illinois statute provided:
"No common law or statutory right to recover damages .... other
than the compensation herein provided, shall be available to any
employee who is covered by the provisions of this act."8 2 Neverthe-
less, the award reserved the employee's rights under the Wisconsin
law, although the Illinois commissioner expressed doubt as to the
effect of the reservation. Subsequently, the Wisconsin commission
awarded the employee additional benefits, overruling an objection
based on the full faith and credit clause. But the Wisconsin
court held that the award should be set aside on the authority of
the Magnolia case. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the judgment and held that the Illinois award did not
81 330 U.S. 622, 47 COL. L. REv. 846 (1947).
82 ILL. ANN. STATS. c. 48, § 143 (Smith-Hurd, 1935).
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bar additional recovery under the Wisconsin statute since the
Illinois law did not expressly foreclose recovery under the law
of another state, but was conclusive only as to the rights arising
in Illinois.
Although the McCartin case does not purport to affect the
technical doctrine of the Magnolia case, it strictly limits its practical
effects. Under the present decision only an express declaration,
statutory or judicial, that an award bars further recovery under the
laws of other states, will bring the Magnolia rule into operation;
and it seems unlikely that any statute will be interpreted to come
within such a narrow scope.8 3
The result in the Magnolia case has been criticised since the
time of its decision. It has been argued that there should be a
relaxation of the full faith and credit clause in relation to work-
men's compensation awards.8 4 Since workmen are often members
of a necessitous class, it is said the state has a special interest in
seeing that its workmen are provided with compensation according
to its own standards.8 5 This special interest cannot be passed
upon by another state, since the machinery for enforcing claims
in each state is adapted to enforcing rights and liabilities arising
under its own laws. The tribunals set up to administer compensa-
tion cannot apply the statutes of another state, as can a court of
law apply the tort law of another state in a negligence case where
there is an extrastate element. There is thus a distinction between
a transitory tort action and 'workmen's compensation proceedings
so far as choice of law is concerned. Because of this distinction, it
has been suggested that a compensation award should not be con.
83 For a collection of statutes see I SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN' COMPENSATION
TEXT §§ 156(e), 163-218 (Sd ed. 1941).
Measured by the rule of the McCartin case, it would seem that even the
Texas law pertinent in the Magnolia case did not make a sufficiently explicit
declaration. The Illinois and Texas statutes are strikingly similar.
The applicable provision of the Illinois statute reads: "No common law
or statutory right to recover damages for injury or death sustained by an
employee while engaged in the line of his duty as an employee, other than the
compensation herein provided, shall be available to any employee who is
covered by the provisions of this act..." ILL. ANN. STATS. c. 48, § 143 (Smith-
Hurd, 1935).
The similar section of the Texas act provides: "The employees of a sub-
scriber shall have no right of action against their employer or against any
agent, servant, or employee of said employer for damages for personal injuries
but such employees . . .shall look for compensation solely to the association."
TEx. REv. Civ. STATS. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon, 1941).
8- Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt; 44 COL. L. REV. 330, 343 (1944).
85 Id. at 344 (where this special interest is compared to the interest a state
has in the support of a minor child). See Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion
in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933).
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sidered res judicata and as constituting a bar to further proceedings
in a second state having a governmental interest in awarding ad-
ditional compensation to the injured workman.8 6
A further criticism of the Magnolia decision is that the em-
ployer is given an opportunity to take advantage of the injured
employee with regard to choice of forums. The employer is likely
to be better informed than the employee concerning the various
state statutes, and may urge an early award in the state which would
grant the lowest amount of compensation. Once granted, this
award would conclusively determine the rights and liabilities of
the parties.
The result in the McCartin case reflects the Court's tendency
to recognize the unique status of workmen's compensation, and to
relax the rigidity of the requirement of full faith and credit in
that field. The cases dealing with workmen's compensation awards
in relation to the full faith and credit clause seem to be following
along a pattern set by the Court in dealing with workmen's com-
pensation statutes. The McCartin case is distinctly parallel to the
Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Company case. There a non-exclusive
statute could not be asserted as a bar to an award in a foreign juris-
diction, and the doctrine of the Clapper case did not apply; in the
McCartin case a statute construed as not providing an exclusive
remedy similarly did not bar additional compensation under the
laws of another state, and the Magnolia case was found inap-
plicable. Whether the Alaska Packers and Pacific cases point the
way for the Supreme Court in cases involving previous awards
remains to be seen. The Magnolia and McCartin cases apparently
stand for the proposition that a state can determine for itself the
extent of the extraterritorial application of its own statute, without
weighing the interests of the second state in the matter. That a
state should be allowed to preclude another from applying its own
act to provide a maximum recovery for one of its injured citizens,
who may become a permanent public charge, seems grossly unfair,
as well as unjustified under the full faith and credit clause. Cer-
tainly the rule, as thus laid down by the Court, does not square
with the policy previously announced in the Alaska Packers and
Pacific cases that the governmental interests of each state connected
with the employment relation should be considered, and that an
award should be sustained if the forum has any governmental
interest to preserve in granting it. An application of this policy
88 Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REv.
1210, 1229 (1946).
9
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to the previous award cases would require the Court to sustain
the grant of additional compensation in a second state if this state
has more than a casual interest in the employment relation. Such
a result would be desirable both from the standpoint of the state
and the injured employee, and it would remove from the first
state granting an award the questionable power of deciding whether
its award should be conclusive of the rights of the parties in a
second state.
2 (a): The Commerce Clause-in the absence of federal legislation:
As has been seen, there are several choice of law theories
applied by the states to determine which law should govern when
an employee is injured while engaged in an interstate transaction.
A great many of the states make some application of the rules of
conflict of law derived from the contract theory. These rules
have been found inadequate and have been extensively modified
by statute and decision. 87 While these modifications were much
needed, their adoption by the different states was not uniform, and
the result has been a most undesirable variation in state policy.
A few states have in effect closed their borders to the compensation
laws of other states. Others have written limitations into their
extraterritorial provisions, or have by judicial decision educed
limitations unknown to the principles of choice of law applicable
to contract. Still others have discarded the contract theory entirely.
When this choice of law question was taken to the Supreme Court
under the full faith and credit clause, it failed to provide a rule
by which the law of one state would automatically be applied to
the exclusion of others. While it is believed that this was a wise
decision, still it contributed little to the solution of the problem.
This uncertainty, connected with workmen's compensation,
is probably felt most by businesses engaged in interstate commerce.
The rapid growth of businesses in this country extending over
state lines, accompanied by a like development in our transporta-
tion and communication facilities, has resulted in the employment
of a large number of workmen in interstate activity. An analysis
of their status under current compensation acts points out serious
deficiencies in existing legislation.
Art. 1. Sec. 8 (3) of the United States Constitution provides:
"The Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
87 See supra page 235.
10
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The grant of power over interstate commerce in the Constitu-
tion, of its own force, established the essential immunity of inter-
state commercial intercourse from direct control of the states with
respect to those subjects embraced within the grant, which are of
such a nature as to demand that if regulated at all their regulation
should be prescribed by a single authority.88 In such a case the
federal power is exclusive, and the states may not act even though
Congress has not exerted its legislative authority,8 9 the silence of
Congress being equivalent of a declaration that the particular
commerce shall be free from regulation." In matters admitting of
diverse treatment, according to the special requirements of local
conditions, the states may act within their respective jurisdictions
until Congress sees fit to act,8 ' and when Congress does act, the
exercise of its authority overrides all conflicting state legislation.
9 2
From the start many employers tried to avoid liability under
state compensation statutes on the ground that injuries to em-
ployees, while they were engaged in interstate commerce, were not
compensable. It was argued that this was exclusively a matter for
Congress, and that, under the Constitution, state industrial com-
missions had no power to make awards for interstate injury. It
was held by the Supreme Court, however, that in the absence of
congressional action, the states may, without infringing the juris-
diction of the Federal Government with respect to interstate com-
merce, legislate concerning relative rights and duties of employers
and employees while within their borders, although engaged in
such commerce.9 3 But to the extent that the subject is covered
by federal legislation, state compensation laws are excluded. 94
Congress, by the enactment of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act, s has legislated concerning the liability of railroad companies
to their employees injured while engaged in interstate commerce.
The Employer's Liability Act, however, permits an injured work-
man to recover damages, only when it is made to appear that the
8 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Texas 9: N.O.R.R., 284 U.S. 125 (1931);
Dahnke-Walker Mill Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Southern Express
Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1916). See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824).
89 South Covington 8: C. St. Ry. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915); Bowman
v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
90 Sanitary District v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); In re Rahner, 140
U.S. 545 (1891).
01 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U.S. 1851); Bradley v.
Public Utilities Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92 (1932).
92 Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57 (1934).
93 Valley Steamship Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U.S. 202 (1917).
94 Southern P. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 251 U.S. 259, 10 A.L.R.
1181 (1920); New York C.R.R. v. Porter, 249 U.S. 168 (1919).
D5 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1926).
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employer railroad was guilty of negligence, whereas the state
workmen's compensation acts authorize compensation for all in-
juries, which are incident to the employment. A large number of
injuries to railway employees are thus excluded from the operation
of the Federal enactment, but will fall within the purview of the
state statutes. The courts in several states formerly held that
compensation for injuries of this class might be made under the
local act.98 The United States Supreme Court did not accept this
view but held that railway employees cannot recover under a state
act for injuries or death arising out of the acts connected with
their employment in interstate commerce, even in those cases where,
by reason of the absence of the employer's negligence, there is no
remedy under the federal act.97 The Federal Employer's Liability
Act is construed as establishing a rule of regulation which is in-
tended to operate uniformly in all states as respects interstate
commerce, and as being in that field both paramount and exclu-
sive.98 The coverage of this statute, however, is limited to inter-
state railway employees, and, with the possible exception of in-
juries to employees as a result of violations of the Federal Safety
Act99 by the railway employer, the state acts are always applied if
the employee was engaged in intrastate activity when injured.100
The Federal Safety Act was enacted to designate the safety devices
to be used on interstate railways, and provides certain rights and
liabilities for their violations. The first cases construing the act
indicated that these rights and liabilities operated to the exclusion
of the state workmen's compensation acts,101 but later cases have
held that since the act does not create, prescribe the measure, or
govern the enforcement of the liability arising from its breach, it
96E.g., Hammill v. Pennsylvania R.R., 87 N.J.L. 388, 94 Atd. 813 (1915);
Moore v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 169 App. Div. 177, 154 N.Y. Supp. 620, aff'd 217
N.Y. 627, 111 N.E. 1092 (1916).
97 Southern P. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 251 U.S. 259 (1920); New York
C.R.R. v. Porter, 249 U.S. 168 (1919).
98 New York C.R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
0927 STAT. 581, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, as amended by 29 STAT. 85, 45 U.S.c.
§ 6, 82 STAT. 943, 45 U.S.C. §§ 8-10; and 86 STAT. 298, 45 U.S.C. §§ 11-16.
100 Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 298 U.S. 141, 104 A.L.R. 881 (1986).
The problem of distinguishing between interstate and intrastate employment
was involved in forty-three cases out of one hundred seventy-two in the first
twenty-five years under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. For discussion
of this question see Schroene and Watson, Workmen's Compensation and
Interstate Railways, 47 HARV. L. REv. 889 (1934).
01 Ross v. Schooley, 257 Fed. 290, cert. denied, 249 U.S. 615 (1918); Kraener
v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 148 Minn. 310, 181 N.W. 847 (1921); Ward v. Erie R.R.,
230 N.Y. 230, 129 N.E. 886 (1921).
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does not extend to the field occupied by the state compensation
acts.1
02
With the exception of the laws applicable to railway em-
ployees and to employees coming within federal admiralty juris-
diction,103 there is no federal legislation dealing with injuries to
interstate employees, occupying the field to the exclusion of state
statutes.104 Hence, the compensation acts of the states are ap-
plicable to interstate workers, unless the acts themselves expressly
deny such applicability. While some of the state statutes make no
mention of interstate employments,105 most of the acts have provi-
sions denying their applicability to interstate employments in some
instances. The statute of Alabama expressly excludes employees
of all interstate carriers from its operation.100 The remaining
statutes may be divided into four basic groups: (1) that group
which provides that the acts shall apply to employees engaged in
interstate commerce, but where Congress has established a rule of
liability, the acts shall apply only to the extent that the interstate
and intrastate work may and shall be clearly separable; 10 7 (2) that
group which provides that the acts shall not apply to businesses
or employments which according to law, are so engaged in inter-
state commerce as to be not subject to the legislative power of the
states;' 08 (3) that group which provides that the acts shall not
apply to employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce
in case the laws of the United States provide for compensation or
for liability for injuries or death in such employments, and which
laws are exclusive;' 1 9 and (4) that group which provides that the
acts shall not apply to common carriers by rail. State statutes can,
'10Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 298 U.S. 141 (1936); Gilvary v.
Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57 (1934).
103For a discussion of the problems of workmen's compensation connected
with federal admiralty jurisdiction, see Hoxtowirz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws 16 (1944).
104In Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n 289 U.S. 92 (1933), it was held
that the Federal Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.
(1985), does not render a state act inapplicable with regard to interstate motoi
carrier employees. The same result has been reached under the Air Commerce
Act, 44 STAT. 569, 49 U.S.C. §§ 171 et seq. (1926), with respect to the interstate
employees of air carriers: Sheboygan Airways v. Industrial Comm'n, 209 Wis.
352, 254 N.W. 178 (1932).
105 For a collection of statutes see DIGEsT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws
(16th ed. 1939 with cum. supp.).
100 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 263 (Michie, Supp. 1951).
107 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
108 Pacific Employer's Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493
(1939).
lo See notes 12 and 15 supra.
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and do to varying degrees apply to interstate employees without
violating the burden on interstate commerce. 1 0
The problem may be outlined by considering two Ohio deci-
sions. In the first, Spohn v. Industrial Comm'n,"' the plaintiff, an
Ohio citizen, was employed in Michigan to drive a truck for an
interstate trucking firm incorporated in Michigan. The company
confined its operations exclusively to interstate commerce. It con-
tributed to the Ohio and Pennsylvania workmen's compensation
funds on the basis of wages paid its terminal employees in those
respective states. To the State Accident Commission of Michigan,
it contributed on the basis of its employees in that state and of all
its interstate drivers. The plaintiff was injured in Ohio while
within the course of his employment and sought compensation
under the Ohio statute,112 which provided that none of the terms
of the Ohio workmen's compensation act shall apply to interstate
commerce, unless the same shall be permitted by the Constitution
of the United States and the Acts of Congress. The Ohio court held
that, except for the above provisions, the coverage of the Ohio act
extended to interstate employees injured within the state, but,
that if so construed, the statute would place an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce. In accordance with the section
in the Ohio act, prohibiting regulation violating the United States
Constitution, it was held the Ohio act should not be applicable." '
A second decision by the Ohio court, however, has limited the doc-
trine of the Spohn case to employers engaged exclusively in inter-
state commerce, 114 so that now the Ohio act will be applied to
injuries within the state even though the injured employee resides
in, and was hired in another state, if part of his duties are in
intrastate commerce.
While the doctrine of these cases is somewhat limited, they do
indicate the possibility of using the commerce clause as an instru-
ment for forcing more uniformity in the application of state com-
pensation laws. Only one case involving the relation of the com-
merce clause to state workmen's compensation statutes has arisen in
the United States Supreme Court. This was Wattawa v. Valley
110 Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Adams Mfg. Co.
v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Freeman v. Hewit, 829 U.S. 249 (1947).
11 138 Ohio St. 42, 82 N.E.2d 534 (1941).
112 OHIo GEN. CODE c. 286, § 1465-37 (Page, 1938).
'12 Cf. Hall v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ohio St. 416, 3 N.E.2d 367 (1936).
114 Holly v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 142 Ohio St. 79, 50 N.E2d 152
(194).
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Steamship Co." 5 Wattawa, an employee of an interstate shipping
company, was injured within the scope of his employment in Ohio.
The Ohio workmen's compensation act 16 provided that all employ-
ers of more than five men should contribute to the state insurance
fund. If the employer did not elect to so contribute, it was provided
that he should be deprived of the common law defenses of contribu-
tory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule, if
sued by an employee for negligent injury. The company had not
complied with the Ohio statute, so an action based on negligence
was brought by Wattawa. The company denied negligence and
claimed assumption of risk by the plaintiff. The company admitted
it employed more than five men, and thus came within the wording
of the Ohio act, but it was claimed the act contravened the commerce
clause when applied to a company engaged in interstate transpor-
tation and hence could not be enforced. The United States Court
held that, in the absence of congressional legislation occupying the
field, the commerce clause does not forbid a state to legislate con-
cerning the relative rights and duties of employers and employees
within her borders, although engaged in interstate commerce.
It is important to note that the employer was a resident of
Ohio, and that the injury, and contract of employment all took
place within the state. No other state had attempted to bring the
employer within the scope of its act with respect to this employee.
If the incidents of the contract of the employment, viz., the contract
of employment, the place of regular employment, the residence
of the parties, and the place of injury had been located in different
states, so that the employer would have been burdened with
qualifying under several state statutes for the same employee, the
result might have been different.
As business expands and the number of interstate employees
increases, the problem will become more acute. It may be argued
that such burden on the employer might be obviated by the em-
ployer paying a premium on the proportion of the workmen's
wages measured by the time spent in each of the several states. This
argument was met in the Spohn case as follows:
"While such arrangement might be reasonable in some
cases, it can readily be seen that such a procedure would at
once become a burden in and of itself in a majority of cases.
Before an employer engaged solely in interstate commerce
might send a workman into or through a state, it would be
11 244 U.S. 202 (1917).
116 OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 1465-37 to 1465-70 (1911).
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necessary for the employer to qualify within the state and
pay a premium, which premium would, in the great majority
of cases, be speculative in amount. It would be somewhat
analogous to securing a visa for foreign travel and paying a
premium on a bond to insure that the workman would not
become a public charge. It would Balkanize the states, the
avoidance of which, and the assurance of free intercourse
among the states, are the purposes of the commerce clause."11
Even if the Supreme Court should declare that one, or some,
of the present theories by which states give their workmen's com-
pensation statutes extraterritorial application are unconstitutional
as applied to interstate commerce, many perplexing problems
would remain. Definition of the difficult term "interstate em-
ployee" would be necessary. 18 Also remaining would be the neces-
sity of specifying the precise amount of contact a state must have
with the incidents of employment before its law would become
applicable, and of determining the relevance of the laws of the
state in which the injury occurred. Uniformity would certainly
be desirable in this respect since the problem is necessarily of con-
cern to more than one state. But if the Supreme Court should
exercise jurisdiction and turn this question of conflicts into a con-
stitutional problem, it may be unduly burdened with litigation as
a practical matter. 9 These disadvantages would appear to out.
weigh any advantage to be gained in freeing limited phases of inter-
state employment from state regulation, so it seems doubtful that
the Supreme Court will resort to the commerce clause for this
purpose.
2 (b) : Federal legislation under the Commerce Clause:
The lack of uniformity among the state statutes, and decisions,
would seem to suggest the passage of a federal workmen's compen-
sation act. An examination of federal experience in this field,
however, reveals many formidable obstacles to such legislation.
Under the authority conferred by the commerce clause, Congress
has the power to legislate concerning the redress of personal in-
117 Spohn v. Industrial Comm'n, 158 Ohio St. 42, 50, 32 N.E.2d 554, 557.
118 For a discussion of the difficulties in defining this term in connection
with the Federal Employer's Liability Act, see Schroene and Watson, Workmen's
Compensation and Interstate Railways, 47 HARV. L. Rav. 389 (1934).
119 If a constitutional question is determined to be involved appeal may be
taken directly to the United States Supreme Court from the highest court
within the state where the action was brought. REv. STATS. § 690 (1875), as
amended 45 STAT. 54 (1928), 28 U.S.C. § 344 (1941). See Dodd, The Power of
The Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws,
39 H v. L. Rav. 533 (1926).
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juries occurring in the course of interstate and foreign commerce.1
2
1
The first effort to create such liability was in the First Federal
Employer's Liability Act, passed in 1906, and declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in 1907, on the ground that Congress
had exceeded its authority in endeavoring to make the law ap-
plicable to all employees of interstate carriers without regard to
whether they were engaged in interstate commerce when injured .
1 2
The act was re-enacted by Congress in 1908, with the provision that
it should apply only to employees of interstate or foreign carriers,
while employed in such interstate or foreign commerce. 122 With
this restriction, the act has been held to be within the authority
of Congress.12 3  This act is an employer's liability act, and not a
workmen's compensation statute, that is, liability is based upon
negligence of the employer, with the customary statutory modifica-
tions of the employer's common law defenses. Under its admiralty
jurisdiction, conferred by Art. III, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, Con-
gress has passed a workmen's compensation statute covering injuries
to longshoremen and harbor workers occurring upon the navigable
waters of the United States.12 4 At present, however, there is no
federal compensation act covering other private employees en-
gaged in interstate and foreign commerce. Several attempts have
been made in Congress to provide such legislation, but none of
these bills have become law.
In 1912, a congressional committee, after two years' exhaustive
investigation, reported voluminously in favor of a federal work-
men's compensation bill for employees injured in interstate com-
merce. Such bills were passed by both Houses of Congress,125 but
because of differing provisions which were never adjusted, failed
to become law. Another attempt was made in 1932 when Senator
Wagner of New York introduced in Congress a compensation
bill, 12 which in its terms and scale of benefits followed very closely
the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. It proposed to provide compensation for disability
120 First Federal Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908); Second
Federal Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1911). See Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 1, 108 A.L.R. 1352 (1937).
121 First Federal Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
22 Second Federal Employer's Liability Act, 85 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C.
§ 51 (1926).
123Second Federal Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
124 Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424
(1927), 83 U.S.C. § 901-950 (1929).
12 These bills were S.B. 5382, and H.R. 20487 passed by the 62d Cong.
2d Sess.
128S X. 4927, introduced June 15, 1932, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
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or death resulting to employees, if the injury was sustained by the
employee while engaged in work of an interstate character. Despite
the inadequacy of the state legislation and of the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act to cover workmen engaged in interstate
employment, this bill did not receive favorable action. A similar
bill,1 27 but restricted in application to employees of air carriers,
was introduced in the Seventy-ninth Congress, but it too failed
to secure the necessary backing for passage.
Many objections have been urged against this proposed legis-
lation. Some of these seem well founded. One important objec-
tion is that these bills, like the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
apply only to injuries sustained in work of an interstate character.
One of the most fruitful sources of litigation under the Federal
Employer's Liability Act has been the determination of the exact
boundary between state and federal jurisdiction, that is, between
service in interstate and foreign commerce on the one hand, and
service intrastate, or local, on the other. At best, then it could be
expected that this drawback of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act would be carried over into the proposed compensation acts.
The question would not be important if the coverage and schedule
of benefits of the state and proposed federal acts were similar, for
then the employee would be equally protected, whether it be
determined he was engaged in intrastate or interstate activity when
injured. The rate of compensation proposed by the federal acts,
however, has been much higher than that allowed by the states,
so that a worker injured in interstate commerce would receive a
much greater compensation than an intrastate worker would receive
for the same injury. This would tend to create ill feeling, and
much litigation on the part of workers in an attempt to qualify
under the federal act.
In connection with this litigation, a serious administrative
defect in the proposed acts would be revealed. The Supreme
Court has held that there is a right under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, to a judicial trial de novo
to re-determine the issue of whether the workman comes within
the federal admiralty jurisdiction and hence under the coverage
of the act.128 Since the question of the character of the employee's
activity, that is, whether intrastate or interstate, would be jurisdic-
tional under the proposed federal legislation, the employee, by
analogy to the rule adopted under the Longshoremen's Act, would
127 H.R. 531, introduced Jan. 3, 1945, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
128 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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probably have a right to a hearing de novo in the federal courts
after an adverse determination by the compensation commission.
This would place a tremendous burden on the courts and would
make administration of the act slow and difficult. Because of these
inherent difficulties, it seems doubtful that future proposals for a
federal compensation act will receive favorable action.
C. EFFECT OF STIPULATIONS ON THE CHOICE OF LAW
In an attempt to avoid choice of law problems under existing
legislation, some employers, contemplating that their employees
may perform services in more than one state, have expressly in-
corporated in the employment contract a stipulation that the law
of a specified jurisdiction shall apply in case of injury. As more
businesses expand over state lines, it is probable that the use of
this type of stipulation will increase, so an examination should
be made of its possible validity and effects.
The problem of stipulation in relation to choice of law has
arisen mostly in connection with contracts. Whether such stipula-
tion should be permitted has been the subject of much discussion
both pro and con.129 There has been a paucity of cases dealing
with stipulation in relation to choice of workmen's compensation
law, so an analysis of its treatment in the contract field should be
useful, especially since workmen's compensation is believed, by
many courts, to be based on contract principles. 1 0
According to one view, the intent of the parties can have no
effect in determining the law applicable to their transactionst01
The law of the place of contracting, it is said, must in all cases be
applied to ascertain the validity of contracts, while matters con-
nected with performance of contracts must be governed by the law
of the place where the contract is to be performed. 3 2 Hence only
the acts of the parties are important in determining the applicable
law, and their intent with reference thereto becomes irrelevant.
33
Where intent of the parties will not be permitted to govern choice
of law relating to ordinary contracts, it would seem most doubtful
12 See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.2, p. 1081 (1935); COOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 412 (1942); Lorenzen,
Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565, 607
(1920), 31 YALE LJ. 53 (1921).
30 See 55 W. VA. L. Rev. 132, and n. 6.
1312 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.2, p. 1079 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 278 (2d ed. 1938); Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in
the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565, 567 (1920), 31 YALE L.J. 53 (1921);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 358 (1934).
132 Ibid.
'33 Cf. E. Gerli : Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931); Owens
v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co., 58 R1. 162, 192 Ad. 158, 122 A.L.R. 113 (1937).
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that such intent would be enforced with respect to workmen's
compensation, since a state's interest with respect to compensation
of injured workmen is much greater than its interest in ordinary
contractual obligations.
There has been much criticism of the view that the intent
of the parties, especially their expressed intent, should be dis-
regarded in choosing the law applicable to their contracts.134 An
examination of this criticism reveals that it is well founded. In
every case, in which the express intent of the parties concerning
the law applicable to their transactions is considered by a court,
the initial question is whether it will be given effect under the
choice of law rules of the forum. It is then the law of the forum
which is applied. The effect is not to permit the law of a foreign
state, as such, to control the legal consequences of an agreement. 10
The case is precisely like one in which the parties, without men-
tioning laws or state, stipulate that the contract shall be determined
in accordance with certain specified rules.13 6 The "rules of law"
of the foreign state take effect, not as the law of the state, but
merely as terms of the agreement of the parties, and those support-
ing this view argue that the foreign law should be given at least
as much effect by the forum, as it would give the applicable pro-
visions of such law if they were expressly written into the contract
by the parties without reference to the law from which they were
taken.137 This view seems well justified in logic and authority
since many examples may be cited in our law where parties to a
contract have been able, by stipulation, to alter what would other-
wise be the legal consequences of their agreements. 38
In states where the parties' expressed intent has been allowed
to govern, their choice of law has been limited by the requirement
134 CooK, Tm LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 412
(1942); Rheinstein, Book Review, 15 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 478, 487 (1948), re-
viewing FALCONBRIID.E, ESSAYS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS; DICEY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 647 et seq. (5th ed. 1932). For a collection of the cases giving effect to
intent of the parties see 15 C.J.S. 890.
135 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551 (1904)hAk 3, 3SW 2136 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Minehandt, ~ r.60 3SW 2
(1904); Louis Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships, 43 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930).
3.37 Cook, Contracts and the Conflict of Laws: Intention of the Parties, 32
ILL. L. Rv. 899 (1938).
138 Id. at 903. Some of the examples listed by Cook are limitations in
bailment contracts; limitations of liability of common carriers; normally as-
signable contractual rights made nonassignable by the parties; time limitation
in insurance policies for notice of loss; the insurance company being absolved
from liability of notice not given within a fixed time, despite a longer period
allowed by the statute of limitations; elective workmen's compensation acts;
arbitration agreements and award; and in some states, limitations on the
alienability of property.
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that it be in good faith, 139 and that it not violate the public policy
of the forum. 140 In the United States, the cases, without exception,
have required that the state, whose law is stipulated, have some
substantial contact with the contract. 14' The theoretical reasons
for this latter limitation are obscure,142 but as a practical matter
there is much justification. To allow a wider choice would place
a possible inconvenient burden on the courts of the forum in dis-
covering and applying the law of some remote jurisdiction, and
perhaps, too often, lead to a clash with the public policy of the
states concerned.
Even if a conflicts rule were accepted, permitting the parties
to designate the law applicable to an ordinary contract, there
would be many objections to extending it to workmen's compen-
sation. At the outset it may be asked if this is a situation where
the parties should be allowed to change the legal consequences of
their acts. Many courts hold that the obligation of the employer
to compensate his employees for injuries occurring within the
course of the employment is more than a mere contractual obliga-
tion. Once the employment relationship is established, it is said,
the law imposes certain obligations on the employer with respect
to his employees.. 43  These obligations are imposed by the state
under its police power because of its governmental interest in seeing
that workmen within its jurisdiction are compensated for their
industrial injuries. 44 Any effort by the parties to change their
rights and duties under compensation acts of this nature will
likely be closely limited.
In those states where workmen's compensation is treated as
contractual, and the parties are permitted to elect by contract to
139 Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. 65 (U.S. 1839); Green v. Northwestern Trust
Co., 128 Minn. 30, 150 N.W. 229 (1914); 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws § 332.2
(1935).
140 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551 (1904); Hagenbeck & Great
Wallace Shows Co. v. Randall, 75 Ind. App. 417, 126 N.E. 501 (1920); see
Winward v. Lincoln, 23 R.I. 476, 51 At. 106, 64 L.R.A. 160 (1902).
141 Brierly v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724, afrd 43 F.2d 730 (3d
Cir. 1930); E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Line, 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931); Owens
v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 58 k.I. 162, 192 Atl. 158 (1937). The English
courts seem to have adopted a contrary view at least by dictum. See Vita Food
Products, Inc. v. Univ. Shipping Co., (1939) A.C. 277. Cf. Duskin v. Pennsyl-
vania Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948).
142 See Rheinstein, Book Review, 15 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 478, 487 (1948)
reviewing FALCONBRIDGE, ESSAYS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws.
143 Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n of Wisconsin, 201 Wis. 474,
230 N.W. 622 (1930).
'44 The rights of the state legislatures to impair the right to contract and
to impair obligations of existing contracts under a proper exercise of the police
power in connection with workmen's compensation is uniformly recognized.
See cases collected in 71 C.J. 287 (1935).
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come under either workmen's compensation or the common law'45
there is much greater reason for giving effect to the intent of the
parties. 146 If these acts may be wholly rejected by the parties, they
should be free to look to the law of another state to determine
their rights and liabilities. Even in this instance, however, it is
arguable that the choice was meant to extend only to the various
laws of the state, and not that the parties might choose the law of a
foreign state.
Many arguments can be made for enforcing the choice of the
parties concerning the workmen's compensation law to cover their
employment. When the employee is engaged in interstate activi-
ties he can never be sure he will qualify for compensation in a
state with adequate coverage, and the extent, or existence of the
employer's liability will be equally uncertain. When the incidents
of employment touch several states there may be several statutes
covering the injury, and the scale of benefits will vary according
to the law elected. An additional burden of the employer would
be the necessity of complying with the statutes of the several states
to avoid possible common law liability, which might in certain
cases be much greater than the amount provided by the compensa-
tion statutes for such injury.
If the parties could designate the provisions of a single state
statute to determine their rights and liabilities, many of these
problems would be averted. The principal objection to this is
that the employee often would not have equal bargaining power
with the employer. If the employer were permitted to impose the
terms of the employment contract, he could select the law of the
state which imposes the least onerous burden from among all the
states which have a substantial contact with the employment. To
permit this would violate the primary purpose of workmen's com-
pensation, which is to provide adequate benefits for industrial in-
juries. Where, however, the purpose of the parties is merely to
provide for definite rights and liabilities in case of injury, there
would seem to be no sound reason for rejecting their attempt. If,
on the other hand, the purpose of the stipulation is to mini-
mize the effect of workmen's compensation laws, and there is a large
discrepancy between the rates provided by the parties, and the
145 See I SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION TEXT. C. 3 (3d ed. 1941).
146 In six states it is provided by statute that the expressed intent of the
parties shall be controlling. Those states are Alabama: ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 26,
§ 259 (1940); Kentucky: KY. REV. STATS. § 342-045 (1948); Maine: ME. REV.
STATS. C. 26, § 2-II-A (1944); Missouri: Mo. REV. STATS. c. 29, § 3700 (6) (1939);
Nevada: NEV. CoMP. LAWS § 2723 (Hillyer, 1929); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 6870 (Williams, 1934).
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rates provided by otherwise applicable statutes, the intent of the
parties should be given no effect on the ground that it is against
the public policy of the forum.
In the event that it is desired to incorporate a provision in the
employment contract concerning choice of law, great care must be
taken to express the exact provisions of foreign law desired to be
applicable. Some of the problems, which may arise if the contract
is loosely drawn, were revealed in a recert federal case.147 In that
case, the plaintiff's decedent, a resident of New York, was hired
by an interstate airline company, a Delaware corporation, as a co-
pilot. The contract of employment, made in Washington, D.C.,
provided that "the Pennsylvania laws, including workmen's com-
pensation" should govern. In discharging his duties, the decedent
made round-trip flights from New York to Pittsburgh, where the
defendant maintained a large operating base, and then frequently
flew on to Chicago, or Birmingham. More of the decedent's flying
service was over the state of Pennsylvania than any other state, but
his duties did not require him to be in any one state the majority
of his working time. The decedent was killed when his plane
crashed in Birmingham, Alabama. At the time of his death, he
was engaged in a flight from New York to Birmingham, which
included a stop-over at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The plaintiff,
the decedent's widow, alleging negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, brought this action, under the Alabama wrongful death
statute, in a federal court in Tennessee. The defense was that
such action was barred by the stipulation in the employment
contract, that Pennsylvania law should govern in case of the em-
ployee's injury or death. The federal district court sustained the
intent of the parties and held the Pennsylvania compensation act
applicable.14 Since this act barred damage actions against em-
ployers, the plaintiff's action was dismissed. On appeal. the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sustained the decision of the
district court, giving effect to the intent of the parties, but reversed
on the ground that the Pennsylvania act was not applicable. It
was held that the decedent could not qualify under the Pennsyl-
vania act since he was not a "Pennsylvania employee" within the
meaning of the act. Reference was then made to the general laws
of Pennsylvania, and it was determined that the Pennsylvania con-
147Duskin v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Co., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.
1948), 16 U. oF Cum. L. REv. 157 (1948).
14871 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Tenn. 1947).
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flicts of law rule dealing with tort problems was applicable. Since
this rule referred the parties to the place of tort, Alabama, the
case was remanded to be tried on the merits according to the
Alabama rule.
It seems quite obvious that the parties did not intend a result
such as this when they expressed an intent in their employment
contract, "that it be governed by the Pennsylvania law, including
workmen's compensation." As in all such cases, however, where
the wording of the contract is not clear, the court must substitute
its own idea of what the parties would have meant had they thought
of the contingency. Since here the reference to the Pennsylvania
compensation act was expressed in general terms, and was not di-
rected to any specific provisions of that act, the court seemed
justified in applying the act as a whole or not at all. Where an
employee is engaged in interstate activity, and there is a possibility
that he would not come within the coverage of the act, which
the parties wish to govern their relationship, the parties should not
make reference to the whole of such act in their contract. Since
the compensatory provisions of these acts are closely tied with
their administrative and procedural provisions, the acts will be of
no use to the parties when they refer to the whole act, unless the
latter requirements are met. Each state has set up its own machin-
ery, and prescribes its own method of administering workmen's
compensation claims. Since this Machinery varies greatly from
state to state, the right to compensation can generally be enforced
only before the tribunal designated by the particular statute cover-
ing the injury. It is very doubtful, then, that a foreign court,
much less a foreign commission, could, or would apply the law of
the state stipulated by the parties to govern the award of compen-
sation. As a result, it would be necessary for the employee to en-
force his claim within the jurisdiction of the state whose laws were
designated to cover the injury, which in some cases might be
distant from the place of ipjury and domicil of the parties. Not
only might this be inconvenient, but in addition, the workman,
once there, would run the further risk of not qualifying as an em-
ployee within the coverage of that act. To avoid this possible
inapplicability, the parties must provide by appropriate language,
that the act shall simply be a quantitative guide for determining
liability. If the act designated by the parties were to regulate no
more than the amount of the claim, there would seem to be no
procedural objection to presenting the claim in any forum which
would have taken jurisdiction in the absence of stipulation.
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D. UNiFowiTrry BY STATE LEGISLATION
It has been seen that existing workmen's compensation laws are
not nearly adequate to provide compensation for employees in-
jured while engaged in work extending over state lines. There is
not sufficient uniformity among the acts to assure employees that
they are protected in case of injury or death occurring in the course
of their employment, and neither is there sufficient uniformity,
where the laws of more than one state are involved to assure the
employer that liability is limited. While a carefully drafted stipu-
lation by the parties, designating a particular act to measure the
amount of their claims may, and it is believed should, avoid much
of this difficulty, such stipulation will be ineffective in those juris-
dictions where the legal consequences of an act or relationship
cannot be altered, even by the parties' expressed intent. Federal
legislation under the commerce clause has been proposed as a cure
for certain of these ills, but it has been seen that the disadvantages
flowing from such legislation would balance or possibly outweigh
any advantages to be gained. The only remaining course of action
to eliminate the confusion and uncertainty under existing laws,
is for the states themselves to pass additional legislation to provide
more uniform benefits and choice of law rules. A few uniform
amendments to state laws should eliminate much of the exisiting
confusion. One such amendment should be a provision expressly
permitting the parties to designate the workmen's compensation
law of any state having a contact with the employment as the
exclusive measure of the benefits to be paid the employee in case of
injury. This modification could be easily made and would do much
to eliminate the uncertainty now attending interstate employment.
Additional legislation should expressly provide the conditions un-
der which the state's law will be given extraterritorial application.
These provisions should enumerate the incidents of the employ-
ment which must exist within the state before its law will be
applied to outside injuries. In this particular, workmen's compen-
sation should be treated as sui generis. It should be required that
a state's contact with the employment be substantial before its
laws are applied to extraterritorial injuries, and conflict of laws
pritciples governing tort and contract liability should be borrowed
only when useful. It will not be attempted to define what the
specific conditions for extraterritorial application of a state act
should be. Many of the present state statutes as well as the
standard developed by the courts in Minnesota and New York
seem satisfactory in this regard, but the difficulty is their lack of
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uniformity. The primary object of new legislation should be
standardization, so that the conditions under which all the acts
will be applied extraterritorially will be the same. To complement
the revisions concerning extraterritoriality, should be a provision
that the local act will not be applicable to injury within the state
when that injury comes within the extraterritorial coverage of
a statute of another state. Such a rule would abolish a frequent
source of conflict, but still an employee would be protected, since
the local act would be applicable whenever he failed to qualify
under the extrastate law.
Until the compensation acts are more uniform, and all pro-
vide a scale of benefits adequate to compensate an injured worker,
there is much argument for permitting an employee to seek a
recovery under the law of both states. The amount recovered in
the first award in such cases should, of course, be deducted from
the second award. It is somewhat difficult to justify such a deduc-
tion on theoretical grounds, however, since to permit a recovery at
all is to admit that the employee has two causes of action, or at
least a divisible cause of action, with respect to the same injury.
In states where such deductions are made, they are justified on
principles of estoppel where there are no applicable statutory pro-
visions. To prevent possible misunderstanding, it would perhaps
be wise to provide for these deductions by express legislation. An-
other desirable reform in existing legislation would be the inclu-
sion of interstate, as well as intrastate employees within the cover-
age of the state acts. While most state statutes apply to interstate
employees, to the extent permissible under the commerce clause
of the United States Constitution, the laws of many states are not
nearly adequate in this respect and should be made more inclusive.
If the states could be induced, or possibly forced by federal
legislation under the full faith and credit or due process clause of
the Constitution, 149 to accept these revisions uniformly, it would
be the happy solution for most of the current choice of law prob-
lems connected with workmen's compensation. The state machinery
is already established and working, so that creation of a new system
of compensation would not be necessary as it would under
the proposed federal legislation. Uniformity would insure work-
a49 For a discussion of the possibilities of federal legislation under these
clauses of the Constitution see Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215
(1933) (dissenting opinion); Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81
U. OF PA. L. REV. 371 (1933); COOK, The Powers of Congress under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,'28 YAL.E L.J. 421 (1919).
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men protection regardless of the place of injury; employers could
arrange their insurance with certainty; and much needless litigation
over jurisdiction would be prevented.
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